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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
·at the
C~OLINA

FORUM, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
'·

CHAPEL HILL, NORTH CAROLINA
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1971 - 8:00 p.m., e.d.s.t.

NEW APPROACHES TO FOREIGN RELATIONS
It may well be recorded in the future that the

II

whole international order shifted and reorganized itself
in a short span of time in the early 1970's.

The accelerat-

ing transition is evident for those of us who are living
through today's changes.
the shift

portend~.

t

.

I

I

What cannot be foreseen is what

Does it lead to a new era of confronta-

tion or toward a new plateau of international stability?
How the die is cast depends heavily on the wisdom which we
in the United States bring to our understanding of our
times.
At the outset, I would point to several manifestations of the current transition in the world and the responses
to them in the nation's foreign policy.

The most immediate, of

course, is the President's new economic program.
years of over-extension haf:f-. s:tretched the U.
bxeaking point.

Twenty-five

s. economy to the

In what " amo~ted to a financial crisis, the

President combined a de

•,

•

~i'acto

I

'd.e valuation of the dollar and a
?

!.

blanket increase in

' ·l

wages and prices.
That something had to give in the way the

u. s.

government was managing the nation's financial affairs was
evident for a long time.

When the moves

came~

however~

understandable that they caused great distress abroad.
is feared

elsewhere~

notably in Europe and

Japan~

the shrinking of a

gr~at

What

is not so

much the moves themselves but what they could portend.
stake are the export markets in the United States

it is

and~

At
hence~

deal of international purchasing power.

It is understandable, in the circumstances that the
search for new economic alignments has intensified.
Kingdom. is

l

moving ~

for

example~

toward the European Economic

Community 1 now, with the support of France.

I·

the whole of Western

Europe~

The United

Germany~

in fact

is tending toward closer commercial

.

relationships with Eastern Europe. · For its part, the Soviet

.

Union seems eager to facilitate this process through political

..

I •

stabilization.

Thus~

the legitimacy of West Berlin as an
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Soviet government is pressing for agreement to _legalize
the territorial changes in Eastern Europe after World War II,
including the division of Germany.

The awarding of the Nobel

Peace Prize to the German Chancellor Willy Brandt, which, in
my judgment, is well deserved, traces in major part to the

impetus that he has given to these developments.

The Unit ed

States is acquiescing, in the new trends in Europe, at a pace,
however, which seems sometimes as reluctant as it is belated,
;

and one would hope that the President's planned visit to
Moscow represents an acceleration of the

u. s.

adjustment~

policies are in transition, too, with regard

to the Far East.

It seems to me, we may have learned, at last

in Viet Nam, the folly of extending ideological fears and
great power animosities into the inner conflicts of underdeveloped regions.

The Vietnamese war has been drained of

'

' .
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meaning for this nation.
.I

It . is revealed, now, as a tragic

.
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.

waste, a revelation that is
~ogram

in the President's

I:e:(~r,cted

of phased troop withdrawals.

over for this nation.

/"
'

In that sense, the war is

There is left in Southeast Asia, however,

the vestige of the mistakes of the past which continue to exact
a toll of senseless death and devastation.

One way or another--

by the action of the President or the Congress or by both-that vestige must and will be removed.

!.

Perhaps, an end to the Indochinese involvement will
be facilitated by the re-awakening of the
~

Sino~U.

s.

relationship.

In any event, China seems to be moving out of a phase of
isolation into one of more active participation in world affairs.
The eftect of this transition and the U.

s.

response to it may

well be causing internal distress in China, the Soviet Union,
in Japan and Taiwan and, undoubtedly, new thoughts in all of them.
There is a point of central significance in these and
;. 1

similar phenomena.

The lingering legacies of World War II

are being liquidated in a massive readjustment.

It is a

cataclysmic process, analogous to the geological adjustments
I,
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of the earth's crust when
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fault lines to produce a new' equilibrium.

f

I

give way along

I •

The international

upheaval, like its geological counterpart, causes sharp

I

reverberations which are widespread and unsettling.
What is involved in the adjustments, is, in part,
the removal of certain legal straitjackets, self-imposed,
which may come to be regarded, someday, as having been extenQed
exercises in ideological rigidity and national pride.

An

example is the prolonged diplomacy of non-recognition in which
we chose to engage after World War II.

We refused to countenance

the Soviet enforced territorial changes in Eastern Europe or
the consequences of the Chinese Revolution.

For what seemed

good and ample reasons at the time, it ·was felt necessary to
cling to the pre-war territorial status quo in Europe, particularly
with regard to Germany, and the pre-revolutionary political
status quo for China.

..

We are .coming to realize, I believe,

that such policies extended indefinitely are self-defeating and
contrary to this nation's best interests.

That is usually the

' J

'I

I

case with policies based

as opposed to ..

·l iving circumstances.
The changes in the legal perspective of our polic i es
are over-shadowed for the moment by the adjustments which see k
to accommodate to contemporary economic realities.

In general,

these adjustments reflect the fact that the United States,
having served in a variety of roles, as the world's chief
banker, policeman, storekeeper and consumer, as well as the
chief pioneer in outer space, has now approached the limit s of
its economic capacity and that some of the burdens and the
"firsts" have to be redistributed.

At last reports, I understand,

we had even abandoned the efforts of the cultural warriors to
"catch up" and surpass the Russians in the classical ballet.
Current adjustments in our international position
have concentrated more heavily on the
1 ,

'
'.

commercial~financial

elements than on certain other over-extended roles abroad,
which I shall discuss shortly.

However, I would like to take

a moment to consider at this point what has occurreq under the
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United States has been preeminent in the world for the past
quarter century.

U. S. markets have absorbed vast quantities

of goods from other nations and sent abroad even greater
quantities.

This nation has led world policy, notably in the

so-called Kennedy round of tariff negotiations, into an era of
vastly expanded international trade through the reciprocal
removal of trade barriers.
At the same time, the U. s. has been the central

I.
banker,of the international payments system.

Settling of

accounts between nations has been based for a quarter of a
century on the dollar and on its convertibility into gold.

The

.system ·worked well as long as other nations were prepared to
hold dollars in their reserves or had free access to

u.

S. gold.

Neither of these conditions remains operative at this time •

.

· .so a search for new devices to. facilitate financial exchange
·. :

··

I

is underway.

In recent international conferences, there have

been proposals for the realignments of values among the various
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currencies, all acknowledging a lessening of the relative value
of the dollar.

.

There have also been proposals for devising an

international substitute for the dollar as the central element
in the international payments system.
Proposals of this sort reflect, in my judgment, both
a healthy decline in the economip dependency of others on the
United States as well as an unhealthy loss of confidence in the

'
stability of the United States economic structure.

Clearly,

the "temporary" surtax on imports causes the deepest concern
abroad.

It ought to be of similar concern on our part.

In

my judgment, the curtailment of international trade which is
implicit in this measure is not the best way, in terms of the
interests of the people of this nation, to bring international
payments into better balance.

If, for no other reason, the new

import leyy, by raising the price of foreign goods, creates a
predisposition to
United States.
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importan~'t-t' ~~ s~oul~ not lose sight of the
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fact that the era of expanding \i~,x ernational trade which we
have fostered for two decades may go down as one of the truly
positive advances in international relations in the 20th
century.

It has stimulated a highly useful economic exchange

that has strengthened the fabric of world stability.

It has

served to underwrite, too, a long period of mutual economic
well-being and cultural enrichment.
Necessary though they may be, the new economic
policies are, at best; temporary expedients.

Without indulging,

·I hope, in excessive hindsight, I am bound to say that the
adjustments might have been ·easier for us and all the world,
had we faced up to our predicament at

~

earlier date and

proceeded in a more measured way to negotiate the necessary
relief.
So far, the other

~

eschewed acts of reprisal.

princ~pal

trading nations have

That unfortunate possibility, however,

0

does exist and on the basis of very recent reports has , now been
,!

~I
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1 by a
expressed for the first tin{e-t
reciprocal
tariff incre~ase
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by Denmark.
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That is a small '" begiruiing.

Should there be a

trade war, it would unravel the strands of a beneficial

.

interdependence which have been woven so carefully over the past
two decades.
In the circumstances, I endorse fully the President's
stress on the temporary nature of the surtax and his
opposition to a return to economic isolationism.

emphati~

The possibility

of an inadvertant slide in that direction, however, is not to
be overlooked.

To avoid it, it seems to me that we must take

more fundamental steps to redress the economic balance than are
contained in the New Economic Policy.
This brings us to the non-commercial aspects of the
nation's international economic difficulties.

Our present

problem of balance of payments is not so much one. of buying too

..,
'

f.

much and selling too little of goods and services in international
commerce; the fact is that, for years, we have sold a great
deal more than we have bought.

Rather, the

difficul~y

arises,

in major part, from the

spen9~~g
,.. w \

•

of vast amounts of publiq
I
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funds in order to maintain an -outmoded military-diplomatic

position in the world.

Dollars spent abroad to underwrite that

position flow overseas just as surely as those which go for
imports of goods from other nations.

Dollars spent at home

to backstop that position contribute just as certainly to the
inflationary pressures as any other non-productive

expenditur~

in the federal budget.
In my judgment, l·.we are paying exorbitantly--in

I

I

billion~of

dollars--to sustain foreign policies and practices

which are simply out of date and which no longer have much to
do with the security and welfare of the people of the nation.
Like other legacies of World War II, these policies and practices
are in urgent need of revision.

\

There is no greater urgency than the liquidation of
the war in Viet Nam.

...

Ending the war is the most compelling

business of this nation.

It is obviously not only a matter of

cost; before all else, Viet Nam is a vast human trage9y which

l
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tears at the fibers of the
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cohesion.

Neverthele~s,

/
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VietNam is also a root cause. o~J~he 'natian's pr~sent economic
difficulties.

What is involved is an astronomical levy of

government expenditure on the nation's economy in order to
finance the war, to date, something in the neighborhood of
$130 billion.

This expenditure has burdened the productive

economy at home with a heavy surcharge in taxes and inflation,
hence, reducing the competitive position of the nation's
commerce in the world.

A great deal of it, moreover, has been

spent abroad, contriQuting directly to the negative balance of
payments.

,-

In two and a half' years, it should be noted, the
President has brought about a significant reduction of the cost
of the involvement in Viet Nam.
has been, it is all to the good.

Prolonged as the reduction
It is to be

hop~d,

however,

that what is being attempted is net simply a gradual tapering
off of the war to a forgott.en, Korean-type residue.

In Viet Nam,

that would still involve, for many years, in my judgment,
·,
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continuing expenditures of1 .'billions in aid to the Saigon
•(t·' .

t. \

government as well as the '· ma.' i ntenance
of U.
• .,.
IJ.

s. forces in

·.;.~·

coastal enclaves in order to shore up a regime with few roots
in its own people.

It would be a continuation of a mistaken

war by other means.

It would be a way of being involved without

seeming to be involved.

Even if it were possible to attain,

it would be a solution that is ill-suited to the needs of
either Viet Nam or the United States.
The Senate has tried to establish a date certain for
a total withdrawal of
~

Since definite

u.

~surances

S. forces as the policy of this nation.
do not yet exist on this point--and

I might say that the outright opposition of the Executive
Branch on this matter only leads to apprehensions as to what
the long range intentions really are--it can be expected that
the matter will be pressed in the Congress; it will be pressed
again and again until the

'.

Mainland

ends~.

involv~ment

on the Southeast Asian

lock, stock and barrel.
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As elusive as it has

'I

seemed, the day must and

the last

u. s.

soldier boards the last troop carrier, the last _helicopter
lifts off Vietnamese

soil~

and the last

u. s.

troop ship

leaves the Vietnamese coast.
I
I

When we leave Indochina, we will have closed the
book on military involvement on the Asian mainland.

It would

not be in this nation's interest, however, to close our eyes
to what transpires on the other side of the Pacific.

It is

time to ask ourselves now what . . will remain, not just in
Viet Nam but in all of East Asia, not in terms of the devastation and disruption which is self-evident but in terms of new
policies which will safeguard this

nation'~

interest and contri-

but more effectively to peace in the years ahead.
It has seemed to me that the Nixon Doctrine might
contain guiding principles in this respect.

In my judgment,

that will not be the case unless the Doctrine means the

.

''

complete termination of

-,

-~
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u. s.

military involvement everywhere

1

___.._
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on the Asian Mainland.

It will not be the case unless .the

Doctrine means an end to the practice of maintaining
quasi-dependencies of the United States in Southeast Asia.

In short, the high purposes of the Nixon Doctrine will be
ill-served if it is bent in practice to sanction a continuing
intervention, direct or indirect, in the inner affairs of Asian
peoples.

On the other hand, the Doctrine will have constructive
meaning for the years ahead, if it implies as I believe it
implies, a new era of shared responsibility, not only in Asia
but throughout the world.

It will have constructive meaning

i f it both preaches and practices a new relationship with other
nations.

It will have that meaning if it calls for "nb more

Viet Nams" and "no more Cambod i as" anywhere in the world.
I n my judgment, internat i onal circumstances neither warrant
nor permit, as in ' the past, the pursuit of peace by the exercise
of the predominant effort of the .United States.

The New

--- -· --~ ~ ---..L16
Economic Policy should make clear to all that we are headed
down the road to national debilitation if we continue to pursue
peace on that basis.
What, then, of the future of
Western Pacific?

u.

S. policy in the

The answer, it seems to me,- is a clearer

I

and cleaner perception of our national interests in the Western
Pacific and an attempt to serve1 them by a new and flexible
system of relationships.

Let me say that, as a starter, I

fully support the initiatives of the Administration in seeking
I

to build a contact of civility with Mainland China.

This

process of diplomatic bridge-building, however, ought not to
proceed

tn

isolation.

It should not lead us to by-pass other

anchor-stones which have already been set in place.
connection, it should be noted that the U.

s.

In this

approach to

Peking burst on the Japanese government with disturbing suddenness.
It came at a time when Japan already was in a sensitive position
due to a special vulnerability to this nation's new economic

I

..

'
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policies as well as to the contraction of our military
projection in Southeast Asia.
In any event, the emergence of China from a
period of isolation does seem to me to open new approaches
to Pacific security by the avenue of negotiations.

One

would hope, for example, in the not too distant future,
for quadripartite discussions ~etween China, Japan, the
Soviet Union and the United States.

Such discussions could

do much to allay unwarranted fears and establish a
adjusting national interests.

b~sis

for

I
They could provide insights

into vital questions involving the internal situation in
China, including the status of Taiwan, into the anxieties and
intentions of the Soviet Union in the

Weste~n

the economic needs not only of Japan and the

Pacific, into

u. s.

but of all

four nations, and into the prospects for curbing nuclear ·
developments in Asia.

Of immediate importance, quadripartite

[_ __

-

-~ ---~
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discussions might provide a vehicle for stabilizing and restoring the Indochina peninsula in the post-war era.

Any regional

security arrangements which might ensue therefrom could be dove- ,
tailed with a progressive reduction in the u• .s. military presence
around the rim of Asia over the next few years.

l

In Europe there is also a need to cut outmoded military
I

I

j

commitments by new security arrangements, the door to which has now
been

opened by West Germany and the Soviet Union.

Insofar as

this nation is concerned, it is long past the time to lighten

I

the archaic burdens of NATO.

Two decades ago; the United States

'I

I

joined the nations of Western Europe in a common commitment to
the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Treaty remains pertinent today,

but the bureaucratic organization--NATO--which has grown up
under the Treaty corresponds not so much to contemporary circumstances in Europe but to those which existed in Europe before
many of you were born.
~

'
~

,.

I
t
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At that time, the free societies of Western Europe
were heavily dependent on the United States and the fear of
Communist totalitarian takeovers was great.
in Korea.

A war was raging

It was a time of trouble, of great international

uncertainty.
That is not the scene today.

I

I.
I

I

Against what is now visible--

a prosperous, stable Western Europe and a growing contact with
Eastern Europe, NATO is over-staffed, over-manned,

over~officered

and over-financed by this nation.
Of the budget of the Department of Defense, about $14
billion is estimated to be traceable to NATO.

Over a half-million

American servicemen and dependents are still consigned to Europe.
That is an immense diversion of our resources.
question of NATO is not cost.

Yet, the basic

If a commitment of that magnitude

were essential for the security of the nation and the stability
of .this nation's peace, of course, it should be made.
the point, however, is whether a huge

u. s.

More to

deployment in Europe

continues to have relevance a quarter of a century after World Warii.

r

- -- l
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In this connection, I returned just a month ago :from a series of
consultations in a number of nations in Western Europe.

The over.

whelming mood there is that of detente and peace; it is not of confrontation and war.

The emphasis is on reconciliation; it is on

intra-European commerce, technological exchange, travel and other
cultural interchange.
tary conflict.

It is not on military power or fear of mili-

Only in NATO circles are the games of war still
I

played with any sense of expectancy or conviction in Western Europe.
Let me reiterate my belief that we do need the North
Atlantic Treaty and Alliance.

We do need to preserve the structure

of NATO as an element-in-being of western defense · and unity.

But I

also believe the organization can be trimmed to a streamlined standby
I

force and our proportionate role can be reduced.

I am persuaded that

that can be done without additional danger to our security or the
stability of peace in Europe and with great benefit to the nation's
well-being.

I am persuaded, too, that unless it is done soon; Western

unity may very well give way under the weight of its

I
[

·"

anachro~isms.

I

I
I

·I

I
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There is a basic lesson in the ·excesses of policy
in Europe and Asia of the past decade or more.

recognized and applied to other areas of the world.
this:

. I

It should be
It is

Military and other national power calcified around

rigid foreign policies tends to be not only wasteful but
dangerous to the nation's future.
wary of all commitments of

We must become extremely

mili~ry

assistance and all forms

of foreign aid in areas of instability abroad where our national
interests are not wholly clear or clearly at stake.
l

I

That applies with special relevance today to our
involvement in the chronic troubles of the Mideast.

It hardly

needs to ,be said here that there is a great deal of sympathetic
interest in this nation with regard to the survival of Israel.
It is not inconsistent with either that sympathy or the
interests of this nation, however, to avoid a U. S. military
entrapment in the Middle East which can take the form of an
inadvertent military confrontation with the Soviet Union or
another Viet Nam.

..

22

What is in our national interest in the Mideast,
as it is in the interests of all the nations of that region
and the world is the stability of the present truce, the
resolution of territorial conflicts, and, remote as the
possibility may now seem, progress towards a new era of coexistence and economic interchange between Israel and the
Arab States.
In this connection, I support the efforts of the
Secretary of State in cooperation with others to secure an
interim peace agreement which has as its main objective the
reopening of the Suez Canal.

As I understand them, the ,

Secretary's proposals provide for preliminary agreement on a
cease fire and on the principle of troop withdrawal without
final or complete a greement at this time.

.The rationale, I

should think, is that a greement on this ultimate objective,
may make it possible to locate way-stations en route.

_._
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If military restraint and a new emphasis on
multilateral action applies 1n Asia and the Middle East,
it applies, too, with regard to Latin America.

Policies

for the Southern hemisphere, it seems to me; must resist
temptations to extend additional military or other unilateral
aid and to reduce further what now flows through these channels.
Unilateral aid can come to represent an intrusion into volatile
political environments and lead, in the end, to direct
involvements.
I

It should be noted that just last

week~ th~

Senate

passed legislation to fund the Inter-American Development Bank
at the annual rate of $900 million for the next two years.
This multi-national institution, along with others of its
kind, should constitute the heart of the nation's foreign
economic aid policy.

The sooner it brings about the termination

of unilateral U• . s. assistance the better for all concerned.
(

Let me close these · remarks on the same note on
which they were opened.

Let me stress my belief that we have

1

24

c.ome to a notable turning point and a notable moment of
opportunity.

We will have to

ma~many

changes to adjust

policies effectively to the realities of the 1970's.

The

changes have much "to do with an end to the illusions of
national omnipotence and omniscience and the tragic adventurism
to which they have led in Southeast Asia.

II

The changes involve

a readiness to share the glare of world leadership which· has

l

focused upon this nation for too long.
We

stand~

now, on the threshhold of a new era in

which prime motivations are appearing.which are other than the
fear of aggression and war.

I

There may exist a possibility

of breaking down antagonisms along the gulf separating the
Communist states from those of the Western world.
The promise is there.

To realize it will take a

vision of the world far less constrained than has been the
case for the past

twenty~five

years.

We will have to begin

to view national power not just as an instrument of territorial
defense or the defense of ideological

r---··1 . _--.:TT_-r.. . . .
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systems~

but rather as

•

25
an element of human survival

well-being.

~nd

National

resources can then be committed in far greater degree to the
fUndamental problems which know no boundaries of race or
nationality:

Population control, the preservation of natural

resources, pollution abatement and the

enli~htenment

of the

human spirit wherever and however it is oppressed.
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